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Abstract 
This paper poses the following question: what would euro area GDP per capita have been, 
had the monetary union not been launched? To this end we use the synthetic control 
methodology. We find that the euro did not bring the expected jump to a permanent higher 
growth path. During the early years of the monetary union, aggregate GDP per capita in the 
euro area rose slightly above the path predicted by its counterfactual; but since the mid-
2000s, these gains have been completely eroded. Central European countries – Germany, 
the Netherlands and Austria – did not seem to obtain any gains or losses from the adoption 
of the euro. Ireland, Spain and Greece registered positive and significant gains, but only 
during the expansionary years that followed the launch of the euro, while Italy and Portugal 
quickly lagged behind the GDP per capita predicted by their counterfactual. We test the 
robustness of the synthetic estimation not only to the exclusion of any particular country 
from the donor pool but also to the omission of each of the selected determinants of GDP 
per capita and to the reduction of the dimensions in the optimisation programme, namely the 
number of GDP determinants. 
Keywords: treatment effects, synthetic control method, monetary union. 
JEL Classification: C33 E42 F15 O52. 
 
 
  
 Resumen 
Este artículo aborda la siguiente pregunta: ¿cuál habría sido el PIB per cápita del área del euro si no 
se hubiese creado la unión monetaria? Para intentar contestarla, utilizamos la metodología de 
control sintético [Abadie y Gardeázabal (2003) y Abadie et al. (2010)]. Nuestros resultados señalan 
que el euro no trajo consigo el salto esperado hacia una senda de crecimiento mayor del PIB per 
cápita. Durante los primeros años de la unión monetaria, el PIB per cápita del área avanzó 
ligeramente por encima de la senda predicha por su contrafactual; pero desde mediados del 2000 
estas ganancias desaparecieron completamente. Los países de Europa central —Alemania, Países 
Bajos y Austria— siguieron una pauta muy similar a la del agregado. Sin embargo, entre los 
países de la periferia obtenemos resultados heterogéneos. Irlanda, España y Grecia registraron 
ganancias positivas y significativas, aunque solo durante los años de expansión inmediatamente 
posteriores al lanzamiento del euro. Por su parte, Italia y Portugal registraron desde el primer 
momento una senda de PIB per cápita inferior a la prevista por sus contrafactuales. En el estudio se 
comprueba la robustez de la estimación sintética no solo a la exclusión de países de la bolsa de 
donantes, sino también tanto a la exclusión como a la reducción del número de variables 
explicativas del PIB per cápita. 
Palabras clave: evaluación de programas, método de control sintético, unión monetaria. 
Códigos JEL: C33, E42, F15, O52. 
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1 Introduction 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) is the most ambitious step to have been taken as part 
of the long process of European integration. As the so-called Five Presidents’ Report1 
recently stated, the euro is more than just a currency. “It is a political and economic project 
and it only works as long as all members gain from it”. Thus, in the recently renewed process 
of enhancing its design, it is crucial to evaluate the effective gains that the euro has brought 
for each of the member states. 
In the years prior to the launching of the euro area, many voices2 recalled that the 
euro area did not satisfy the conditions identified in the theory of Optimal Currency Areas 
(OCA) for a welfare-improving monetary union. Belonging to a monetary union means giving 
up control of monetary policy, which may become a key instrument in the presence of 
asymmetric shocks. As mentioned by Mundell (1961), the costs of losing the monetary 
instrument will be all the lower the higher wage flexibility is, the higher labour mobility is or, as 
De Grauwe (2013) recalled more recently, whenever the monetary union is also embedded in 
a budgetary union. However, it was also thought that launching a monetary union would entail 
undoubted benefits via the increase in trade and investment. The Delors Report (1989) and 
the One Market One Money Report3, which greatly influenced the adoption of the euro, 
considered that the main welfare improvement ingredient was expected to result from the 
elimination of exchange rate risk, which had traditionally been one of the main sources of 
uncertainty characterising Europe (De Grauwe P, 2012). This, together with the expected 
reduction of interest rates, led the Commission to conclude that the adoption of the euro 
would move the euro area to a durable higher growth path. 
Has this prediction come true? Figure 1 displays the average euro area yearly growth 
rate of per capita GDP, employment and inflation for the period before (1990-1998) and the 
period after the adoption of the euro in 1999, divided into two sub-periods: 1999-2007 and 
2008-2011. We also depict yearly growth rates of the three variables for Japan, the United 
States and the United Kingdom. From the cross-country comparison, the chart points out 
that the euro area has achieved significant progress in terms of generating employment and 
reducing inflation. However, in terms of the GDP per capita growth rate, aggregate data for 
the euro area does not seem to follow the expected path: “a jump to a permanent higher 
growth path”. Moreover, when looking at the Great Recession period, the euro area has 
undergone a contraction in terms of GDP per capita and employment greater than that 
registered in the United States and Japan. 
This paper attempts to shed some light on whether the euro had a significant impact 
on the GDP growth rate of the euro area. The question we seek to answer is what euro area 
GDP per capita would have been had the monetary union not been launched. The question is 
not new in the economic literature. Drake and Mills (2010), using data since 1980, 
decompose euro area GDP into trend and cyclical components through the “optimal 
approximation” band pass filter developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). The GDP 
trend they obtained, both under the assumption that it evolves as a deterministic function or 
as a stochastic process, suggests that the adoption of the euro appears to have reduced the 
                                                                          
1. Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (2015). 
2. Eichengreen (1990) and De Grauwe and Heens (1993), among others. 
3. Commission of the European Communities (1990). 
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trend rate of growth of the Eurozone economies, both ex ante, during the Maastricht nominal 
convergence phase, and ex post, during the period from 2001 to 2006. Following a different 
approach, Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2010) also pose the question of whether the 
observed growth path in the EMU years could have been expected on the basis of the past 
distribution and conditioning on external developments. To capture external developments, 
they choose the US, the other large common-currency area in the world, as the 
counterfactual of the euro area4. After estimating a VAR for the period 1970-1998, they 
conclude that for each year since the inception of EMU, euro area growth is not significantly 
different from what is expected on the basis of the pre-EMU economic structure and the US 
business cycle. However, from 2001 to 2005, growth in the euro area is always on the lower 
side of the confidence bands. 
Figure 1: GDP Per capita, employment and inflation 
  
 
 
Source: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España. 
This article examines the impact of the introduction of the euro in terms of real GDP 
per capita, as in Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin et al (2010), but using the synthetic control 
methodology that was first introduced in the economic literature by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003). We build a counterfactual that closely reproduces euro area GDP per capita during 
the years before the intervention. The counterfactual is defined as a linear combination of 
countries of the donor pool that minimises the differences with the treated unit in a set of 
relevant covariates and past realisations of the outcome variable during the pre-intervention 
period. In this spirit, it becomes a key condition that countries that belong to the donor pool 
should look similar in terms of development to countries that belong to the euro area, and 
also that they do not turn out to be affected by the launching of the monetary union. Hence, 
the difference between the GDP per capita of the treated country (i.e. the euro area) and the 
counterfactual (i.e. the synthetic) from the year of the intervention onwards allows us to 
quantify the impact of the monetary union. 
                                                                          
4. The choice of US output as a conditioning variable is motivated by the findings that the dynamic correlation between 
US and euro area growth is robust and has been stable over time. 
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Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) used this approach to assess the impact of the 
terrorist conflict on GDP per capita in the Basque Country. More recently, this methodology 
has also been applied to quantify the effects of the large-scale tobacco control programme 
that California implemented in 1998 (Abadie et al, 2010), to evaluate the economic impact of 
the 1990 German reunification on West Germany (Abadie et al, 2015), to investigate the 
impact of economic liberalisation on real GDP per capita in a worldwide sample of countries 
(Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013) and to measure the impact of private sector reforms, such as 
the adoption of the one-stop shop, on GDP per capita (Gathani et al, 2013). In the context of 
the European Union, Campos et al (2014) resort to the synthetic control methodology to 
analyse the growth gains from the European Union for its member countries, while Mäkelä 
(2014) addresses the question of whether the monetary union has affected its members’ 
sovereign risk premiums. 
Our main result is in line with that obtained previously in the literature: the adoption of 
the monetary union in the euro area did not produce the expected permanent increase in the 
GDP per capita growth rate. However, when we step down to the country-level details, we 
observe very different patterns. Firstly, central European countries -Germany, the Netherlands 
and Austria- did not seem to obtain any gains or losses from the adoption of the euro. 
Secondly, among countries from the periphery, Ireland, Spain and Greece registered positive 
and significant gains throughout the years of expansion that followed the launching of the 
euro area but up to the debt crisis, while Italy and Portugal quickly lagged, despite the 
expansionary cycle, behind the GDP per capita predicted by their counterfactual.  
The euro area was designed as an additional step in the process of European 
integration. It was thought it would bring further increases in intra-area trade that would boost 
GDP growth, mainly because of the stability of the exchange rates, as well as an endogenous 
demand for structural reforms that would also propel convergence within the euro area. The 
demand for structural reforms should have endogenously emerged from the need to design 
sufficiently flexible economies to face shocks without the use of the exchange rate. However, 
perhaps because of the arrival of China on the world trade stage and the resultant increase in 
the international fragmentation of production, intra-area trade did not rise. Neither did the boost 
for a consistent strategy to implement productivity enhancing reforms arrive, in a context where 
the previously inflationary member countries benefited from the favourable financing conditions. 
The broad reduction in long term interest rates favored the recently so called reform anesthesia 
that propelled the divergences among member countries. Then, the initial welfare gains that the 
euro brought did not consolidated in the long run, leading the European project to a risky cliff.  
Looking forward, it is crucial that all member countries benefit from the joint-venture 
and this is only possible if the euro area keeps on giving steps towards a stronger convergence 
via structural enhancing productivity reforms and an improvement of the European governance. 
This spirit is shared by recent ECB research that attributes this lack of convergence to the 
notably weak institutions, structural rigidities, weak productivity growth and insufficient policies 
to address asset price booms (ECB, 2015). Also, the Five Presidents’ Report has called for 
“further steps, both individually and collectively, to compensate for the national adjustment tools 
that countries gave up on entry” in order for all members to gain from the euro. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the synthetic 
control methodology. Section 3 displays the results that we obtain, devoting special attention 
to their robustness. Section 4 discusses a plausible interpretation of our results, while section 
5 concludes. 
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2 The synthetic control methodology 
Assume that there is a sample of J+1 units (in our case, countries) and unit j=1 is our unit of 
interest (in our case, the euro area), while units j=2 to j=J+1 are the potential comparisons. 
The literature usually refers to unit j=1 as the “treated unit”, i.e. the unit exposed to the event 
or intervention of interest, while units j=2 to j=J+1are referred to as the “donor pool”, i.e. the 
group of potential comparison units. In order to be able to construct a reliable synthetic 
control, the donor pool has to fulfil three characteristics. First, it has to be restricted to 
countries with some similarity in observable characteristics in order to prevent interpolation 
biases; second, countries should not undergo structural shocks to the outcome variable 
during the sample period of the study; and third, their outcome should not be affected by the 
intervention implemented in the treated unit5.  
Suppose that all units are observed during t=1,…,T periods, in such a way that the 
time span includes a positive number of pre-intervention periods, T0, and a positive number of 
post-intervention periods, T1, with T= T0+ T1.  
Let Yjt be our variable of interest, namely GDP per capita, which would be observed 
for country j at time t in the absence of the intervention. Let ଵܻ௧ூ  be the outcome that would be 
observed for the treated country after being exposed to the intervention, that is, in periods 
T0+1 to T. Let ߙଵ௧ ൌ ଵܻ௧ூ െ ଵܻ௧ be the effect of the intervention for the treated country at time t. 
Then, under the general model: 
௜ܻ௧ூ ൌ ߜ௧ ൅ ߙ௜௧ܦ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜௧ 
௜ܻ௧ேூ ൌ ߜ௧ ൅ ݒ௜௧                                                   (1) 
ݒ௜௧ ൌ ߠ௧ܼ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
where ߜ௧ is an unknown common factor, ܼ௜ is a vector of observed covariates not 
affected by the intervention, and where unobserved confounders, ߣ௧ߤ௜, are allowed to change 
over time; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) show6 that if there is a vector of weights 
W=(w2,…,wJ+1)’ with 0<=wj<=1 and w2+…+wJ+1=17, such that: 
∑ ݓ௝∗ ௝ܻଵ ൌ ଵܻ,ଵ௃ାଵ௝ୀଶ 		,		……………..		,		 ∑ ݓ௝∗ ௝ܻ బ் ൌ ଵܻ, బ்௃ାଵ௝ୀଶ                          (2) 
and 
∑ ݓ௝∗ ௝ܼ ൌ ܼଵ௃ାଵ௝ୀଶ                                                          (3) 
 
                                                                          
5. Assumption of no interference across units (Rosenbaum, 2007). We will further discuss in section 3 how this 
assumption may bias our results. 
6. Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) argue that if the number of pre-intervention periods in the data is large, 
matching on pre-intervention outcomes helps control for the unobserved factors affecting the outcome of interest as well 
as for the heterogeneity of the effect of the observed and unobserved factors on the outcome of interest. 
7. These assumptions prevent extrapolation biases. 
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We can define, as long as the number of pre-intervention periods is large enough, 
the following estimator for ߙଵ௧: 
ߙොଵ௧ ൌ ଵܻ௧ூ െ ∑ ݓ௝∗ ௝ܻ௧௃ାଵ௝ୀଶ , 
Therefore, the synthetic control is defined as a weighted average of the units in the donor 
pool and can be represented by a J x 1 vector of weights W*=(w2,…,wJ+1)’.  
In practice, the optimal vector of weights w* must satisfy conditions (2) and (3). Let X1 
be a (k x 1) vector containing the values of pre-intervention characteristics of the treated unit that 
we aim to match as closely as possible, and let X0 be the k x J matrix collecting the values of the 
same variables for the units in the donor pool. The difference between the pre-intervention 
characteristics of the treated unit and a synthetic control is given by the vector X1-X0W. We 
select the synthetic control W* that minimises the size of this difference. That is to say:  
෍ ݒ௠
௞
௠ୀଵ
ሺ ଵܺ௠ െ ܺ଴௠ܹሻଶ, 
where X1m is the value of the m-th variable for the treated unit, X0m is a 1 x J vector containing 
the values of the m-th variable for the units in the donor pool and vm is a weight that reflects 
the relative importance that we assign to the m-th variable when we measure the discrepancy 
between X1 and X0W. The choice of v influences the mean square error of the estimator. We 
choose v among positive definite and diagonal matrices such that the mean squared 
prediction error of the outcome variable is minimised for the pre-intervention periods (Abadie 
and Gardeazabal, 2003). 
min௩ ෍ቌ ଵܻ௧ െ෍ݓ௝ሺݒሻ ௝ܻ௧
௃ାଵ
௝ୀଶ
ቍ
ଶబ்
௧ୀଵ
 
There are several advantages to using this econometric approach. First of all, unlike 
the difference-in-difference approach, we do not choose who the comparison group is, since 
weights assigned to each of the members of the donor pool are data-driven. Second, once 
the synthetic unit is defined, we can follow growth performance over time without limiting the 
analysis to an average effect estimator. And finally, unlike linear regression models, the 
synthetic control methodology avoids extrapolation outside the support of the data. 
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3 Estimating the impact of the euro on euro area GDP per capita  
3.1 The donor pool and variable selection 
We use yearly country-level data for the period 1970-2013. The euro was adopted in 1999 so 
we will have a pre-intervention period of 29 years. However, our benchmark estimation will 
rely on a shorter pre-intervention period –1992 to 1998 – in order to isolate our preferred 
estimation from the potential benefits derived from the European integration process that took 
place during the 1970s in countries from northern and central Europe, and during the 1980s 
in southern European countries. In 1992, the European Union launched the Single Market and 
countries, for the first time, delegated economic policy functions to the European level.  
In order to construct the donor pool we disregard countries that are at a very 
different stage of development, such as those from Asia, Africa or South America, since we 
want to avoid extrapolation biases. Moreover, we exclude countries that might potentially be 
affected by the consolidation of the euro area. That is why we exclude countries from the 
European Union, in particular the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, since they 
voluntarily opted not to join the euro area. Finally, we also exclude eastern European countries 
that joined the euro or the EU at a later date. Therefore, we finally have 11 OECD countries in 
the donor pool: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, New 
Zealand, Turkey and the United States. However, we are aware that our donor pool may still 
not be fully sterilised since the euro process may have had spillover effects on non-member 
countries. We will let the model operate and, once results are obtained, we will discuss the 
potential biases that may arise. 
All the variables that we use are obtained from the OECD database. The variable of 
interest, GDP per capita, Yjt, is PPP-adjusted and measured in 2005 US Dollars8. Measuring 
our variable of interest in levels gives us the opportunity to check whether the adoption of the 
euro had a divergent long-run growth path or whether we faced a step effect that built up 
over time given the lags of the economy (Billmeier and Nancini, 2013). For the set of 
characteristics we use standard economic predictors: share of public and private 
consumption in GDP, share of investment in GDP, share of exports and imports in GDP, 
average years of education9 and the ratio of people aged 65 and above relative to the 
population aged between 16 and 64 years old (which we call the dependency ratio), in order 
to control for the demographic structure of the economy. We have also worked with variables 
to take into account country price dynamics and R&D investment, but the fit did not improve 
so we have not included them in our final specification. 
Finally our definition of the euro area includes eleven countries. These are all the 
countries that met the euro convergence criteria in 199810, excluding Luxembourg, and 
adding Greece, which did not qualify until two years later. Despite this slight difference in 
timing, we will consider 1999 as the intervention date when examining the euro area 
aggregate. 
                                                                          
8. We consider real per capita GDP PPP-adjusted because this facilitates international comparisons on the levels of 
economic activity. We follow the OECD recommendation of deflating per capita GDP by the PPP of a fixed year. It has 
both the advantage of using a price structure that is consistently updated and of protecting against the variance from 
one year to another of PPP calculations (see Lequiller and Blades, 2014).  
9. We obtain this variable from the Barro and Lee (2014) dataset. 
10. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
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3.2 Results 
One of the advantages of the synthetic control methodology is that results can be displayed 
easily in one chart that needs little clarification. This chart is depicted in Figure 2: it displays 
euro area GDP per capita and its synthetic counterpart for the years 1992 through 2013. The 
synthetic euro area almost exactly reproduces observed GDP per capita during the pre-
intervention period. Moreover, this close fit is not only limited to the variable of interest but 
also to most of the GDP determinants (see Table 1). 
     Figure 2: Euro area GDP per capita. Observed vs. synthetic estimation  
                                           (pre-treatment period 1992-1998) 
 
Table 1: Means of GDP per capita and of its determinants before the adoption  
                                                    of the euro (1992-1998) 
 
Source: OECD and Banco de España. 
Note: The average of each variable for the 1992-1998 period is shown. 
 
The estimation of the impact of the euro on GDP per capita of the euro area is given 
by the difference between the observed GDP per capita and the synthetic counterpart since 
1999. Our estimation shows that, after the adoption of the euro, the area’s GDP per capita is 
2.7% higher on average than it would have been, had the euro not been launched. However, 
these initial gains did not last and they completely disappear before the mid-2000s. Results 
show that between 2004 and 2007, euro area GDP per capita is 0.7% lower on average than 
it could have been, if the euro project had not been implemented. That is, our finding seems 
to sum up the previous evidence in Drake and Miller (2010) and Giannone et al. (2010) 
suggesting that the adoption of the euro did not bring the expected jump to a durable higher 
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EURO AREA SYNTHETIC EURO
GDP PER CAPITA 25152.40 25127.65
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PUBLIC CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.21 0.16
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growth path. In fact, in the year prior to the start of the Great Recession, euro area GDP per 
capita fell slightly below the level predicted by the counterfactual. In the following section we 
perform different exercises to show the robustness of the result: slight initial gains from the 
adoption of the euro that did not last. 
3.3 Robustness of the results 
On the benchmark specification we opted for a short pre-treatment period mainly in order to 
isolate the gains from adopting the euro from the gains of European integration. Therefore, 
the first exercise to assess the robustness of the result depicted in Figure 2 is to consider a 
longer pre-treatment period: from 1970 to 1998. Figure 3 shows that results remain fairly 
stable. As in our benchmark estimation, the synthetic GDP per capita reproduces that of the 
euro area during the pre-treatment period. Regarding the expected role of the euro, we find 
that results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those obtained in the benchmark 
scenario: there is an early stage where the monetary union has a positive impact on its GDP 
per capita, but from the mid-2000s onwards the gains completely vanished. 
        Figure 3: Euro area GDP per capita. Observed vs. synthetic estimation  
                                               (pre-treatment period 1970-1998) 
 
To further assess whether we could attribute to the adoption of the euro the 
difference between the changes observed in GDP per capita and its synthetic counterpart, we 
perform two placebo exercises. In the first, we check whether the treatment had any effect on 
a country, Australia, which does not belong to the euro area. Results are reported in Figure 4. 
In the second exercise we assume instead that the treatment took place in a different year, 
1995. In this case we are somewhat limited because the 1980s and the 1990s were decades 
of continuous developments in European economic integration. Results of this placebo 
exercise are reported in Figure 5.  
In both cases we obtain a good match between the GDP per capita of the country 
treated and the counterfactual during the pre-treatment years. Besides, as we were 
expecting, no differences emerge between the variables after the treatments. This evidence 
backs the idea that the differences observed in Figure 2 can be attributed to the adoption of 
the euro and are not potentially reflecting the lack of predictive power of the synthetic control. 
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Figure 4: Placebo intervention in 
1999. Australia GDP per capita. Observed vs. 
synthetic estimation (pre-treatment period 
1970-1998) 
Figure 5: Placebo intervention in 
1995. Euro area GDP per capita. Observed 
vs. synthetic estimation (pre-treatment period 
1970-1994) 
At this point we illustrate the country and the variable weights, i.e. the W and the v that 
we obtain from the estimation of the synthetic euro area GDP per capita . In Table 2 we display 
the weight that countries in the donor pool ultimately receive in each of the three counterfactuals 
for the euro area we have shown so far (Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 5). Switzerland and Turkey 
turn out to be the countries that receive more weight across the three counterfactuals, up to 
50%, while Iceland, Japan, Norway and New Zealand make up the other 50%.  
                Table 2: Synthetic weights of countries in the donor pool 
 
                                       Table 3: Synthetic weights of variables  
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AUS 0 0 0
CAN 0 0 0.10
CHE 0.34 0.23 0.20
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JAP 0.09 0.15 0.19
KOR 0 0 0
MEX 0 0 0
NOR 0.07 0.20 0.20
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Preferred synthetic       
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Long synthetic            
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1995 Placebo synthetic 
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1970‐1994)
GDP PER CAPITA 99.94% 61.17% 81.72%
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.01% 0.18% 0.03%
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
INVESTMENT (SHARE OF GDP) 0.00% 1.35% 0.01%
EXPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.00% 36.55% 18.17%
IMPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.01% 0.19% 0.01%
AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION 0.02% 0.50% 0.06%
DEPENDENCY RATIO 0.02% 0.06% 0.00%
Preferred synthetic       
(pre‐treatment period: 
1992‐1998)
Long synthetic            
(pre‐treatment period: 
1970‐1998)
1995 Placebo synthetic 
(pre‐treatment period: 
1970‐1994)
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As we pointed out in the previous section, a major concern arising from this 
approach is that the construction of the euro area may potentially have a positive or a 
negative effect not only on its member countries but also on the countries included in the 
donor pool. If this were the case, the assumption of non-interference across units would no 
longer apply and we would not be able to construct a proper counterfactual. The estimated 
gap would then be a lower bound, in the case of positive spillovers, or an upper bound, in the 
case of negative spillovers. 
To tackle this issue we first repeat, for every single country in the donor pool, the 
placebo exercise reported in Figure 4 for Australia. Results, reported in Figure A1 of the 
Appendix, show no clear sign of either positive or negative spillovers among those countries 
for which we can construct a reliable counterfactual. Also, we assess whether Figure 2 is 
sensitive to the exclusion of any particular country from the sample or any particular variable 
from the estimation. With this purpose we first iteratively re-estimate the baseline model to 
construct a synthetic euro area omitting in each iteration one of the countries that received a 
positive weight in our preferred estimation. Figure 6 displays the result. As expected, results 
seem to be fairly robust to the exclusion of any particular country from our donor pool and the 
observed euro area GDP per capita always lies below its counterfactual from mid-2000 
onwards. 
            Figure 6: Euro area GDP per capita. Observed vs. synthetic estimation. Synthetic 
               estimation calculated by removing countries from the donor pool one by one  
 
Note: The solid black line is the observed euro area GDP per capita, the dashed black line  
is the preferred synthetic estimation, the dashed blue line is the synthetic estimation without 
Switzerland and the dashed red line is the synthetic estimation without Iceland. 
Now, as a final robustness check, Figure 7 and Figure 8 present the same exercise 
as that above but testing, first, the sensitivity of the synthetic estimation to the omission of 
each of the selected determinants of GDP per capita (Figure 7) and, second, to the reduction 
of the dimensions in the optimisation program, i.e. from eight to two (Figure 8). Again, the 
results seem to be fairly stable. In almost all the counterfactuals we obtain the same result as 
in Figure 2: the adoption of the euro seemed to bring some initial small gains, albeit short-
lived, which eroded before the mid-2000s. The only exceptions are the green and red line in 
Figure 8 which display the synthetic control when we only take into account two or three 
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dimensions11 to be matched during the pre-intervention period. However, in these two cases, 
the vector of weights obtained does not seem to match euro area per capita GDP before 
1999, invalidating them as a reliable counterfactual. 
Figure 7: Euro area GDP per capita. 
Observed vs. synthetic estimation. Synthetic 
estimation calculated by removing GDP 
determinants one by one  
Figure 8: Euro area GDP per capita. 
Observed vs. synthetic estimation. Synthetic 
estimation calculated by reducing the 
number of GDP determinants  
Note: The solid black line is the observed euro 
area GDP per capita, the dashed black line is the 
preferred synthetic estimation and the dashed red 
line is the synthetic estimation removing per capita 
GDP as a determinant.  
Note: The solid black line is the observed euro 
area GDP per capita, the dashed black line is the 
preferred synthetic estimation and the dashed red 
line is the synthetic estimation with only two 
determinants and the dashed red line is the 
synthetic estimation with three dimensions.  
3.4 The effect on individual member countries 
The results we have obtained so far point to a negligible impact of the adoption of the euro on 
GDP per capita of the euro area aggregate. However, the effect for individual countries is 
heterogeneous and also changes over time. In this section we intend to address the question 
of the degree to which certain countries have benefited from the adoption of the euro. That is, 
for each country our research question now becomes: “what would, for example, Austrian 
GDP per capita have been, had the euro area not been created?” We have grouped countries 
into two categories: central European countries and peripheral ones. Figures 9 and 10 display 
the results comparing the changes observed in each country’s GDP per capita and its 
counterfactual, while Table A1 documents the weights that each country of the donor pool 
receives within each counterfactual and Table A2 assesses the goodness of fit for each of the 
variables that we consider during the pre-intervention period. 
When looking at the central European countries we undoubtedly find that for three of 
them, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, the adoption of the euro did not result in any 
gains or losses and, as a result, did not bring the expected jump in GDP per capita. These 
results hold when we extend the pre-intervention period to 1970-1998 (see Figure A2 of the 
Appendix). Unfortunately, given the common structure we have considered in terms of 
variables and countries in the donor pool, the counterfactual for French GDP per capita is not 
as good as might have been desirable. Nevertheless, we find that France registered the same 
result as the euro area aggregate: slight initial gains that did not last, were soon erased and 
                                                                          
11. When optimizing over two dimensions we take into account GDP per capita and share of exports, while when we 
optimize over three dimensions we also add the share of investment. 
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turned into losses. Regarding Belgium and Finland we find two opposite patterns. While 
Finland would seem to be benefitting from the adoption of the euro, Belgian GDP per capita 
would be below its counterfactual.  
Turning now to the peripheral European countries, we can distinguish two 
subgroups. On one hand, three countries, Spain, Greece and Ireland12 registered the 
expected jump to a durable higher growth path of GDP per capita. And this jump turned out 
to last throughout the expansion period, in contrast with the evidence we found for the euro 
area aggregate. In Figure A3 of the Appendix we also show that results remain when we 
consider a longer pre-intervention period. On the other, Italy and Portugal stand out as 
countries where the initial gains from the adoption of the euro in terms of GDP per capita 
disappeared very quickly but also turned into significant losses from the path of the 
counterfactual. 
Figure 9: GDP per capita of euro area member countries . Observed vs. Synthetic 
                                                    estimation. Core countries 
 
  
                                                                          
12. In the case of Ireland, we have not been able to obtain a good counterfactual, this is a vector of country weights that 
matches closely GDP per capita of Ireland for the pre-treatment period.  
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        Figure 10: GDP per capita of euro area member countries. Observed vs. Synthetic 
                                              estimation. Peripheral countries 
 
3.5 Significance of the results 
One important caveat of the synthetic control methodology is that it does not allow us to 
assess the significance of the results obtained. In Table 6 we report the average magnitude of 
the gains/losses from the adoption of the euro that we depicted in Figure 2 for the euro area 
and in Figures 9 and 10 for each of the member countries. We have divided the euro 
intervention period in three sub-periods, 1999-2003, 2004-2007 and 2008-2013, since the 
gap varies in sign across time. The reported gain or loss is calculated as the average 
difference in the per capita GDP between the observed and the counterfactual levels. 
In order to assess the significance of these gaps we have followed the approach of 
Campos et al. (2014) by estimating a simple difference-in-difference model for the actual and 
the synthetic GDP per capita series of member countries as well as of the euro area 
aggregate. That is, for each country ݅, we test whether the following double difference is 
significant: 
቎ ௜ܻ௣௢௦௧ି௜௡௧௘௥ െ෍ݓ௝∗ ௝ܻ௣௢௦௧ି௜௡௧௘௥
௃ାଵ
௝ୀଶ
቏ െ ቎ ௜ܻ௣௥௘ି௜௡௧௘௥ െ෍ݓ௝∗ ௝ܻ௣௥௘ି௜௡௧௘௥
௃ାଵ
௝ୀଶ
቏ 
The significance is reported in Table 6 using the conventional asterisks. 
As expected from scrutiny of Figure 9, we cannot conclude that the initial small 
positive gaps that we obtained for Austria, Germany and the Netherlands will ultimately turn 
out to be significant. The same is true for those gaps obtained for the euro area aggregate 
and for France. However, the positive gaps are significant in Spain, Greece and Ireland, and 
not only for the initial period, but also, in the case of the two latter countries, throughout the 
years of expansion. Until 2007 average GDP per capita for Spain, Greece and Ireland was 
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5.8%, 10.4% and 24.3% higher, respectively, than it could have been, if the euro had not 
been implemented. Finally, losses, in reference to the counterfactual, turn out to be significant 
during the boom years in Portugal and Belgium, averaging 11.2% and 6.31%, respectively. 
 
          Table 6: Growth dividends from euro area membership: average difference (%)  
          in post-treatment GDP per capita between observed and counterfactual levels 
 
Note: Each figure represents the average difference in percentage points between the 
observed GDP per capita and the estimated counterfactual using the synthetic control 
methodology. Asterisks denote whether these estimated gaps are ultimately significant 
 using a double-difference approach. *** significance at 1% level, ** significance at 5% level and * 
significance at 10% level. 
SPAIN 7.91 ** 3.85 0.43
GREECE 8.74 *** 15.12 *** 1.00
IRELAND 23.90 *** 24.67 *** 8.50
ITALY 1.81 -3.26 -11.22 ***
PORTUGAL 2.08 -11.21 *** -12.57 ***
AUSTRIA 0.23 -2.54 -1.30
GERMANY 0.94 -1.05 1.80
NETHERLANDS 1.00 -3.72 -1.52
FRANCE 3.32 -1.66 -1.36
FINLAND 7.23 10.47 ** 10.65 ***
BELGIUM -2.19 -6.31 ** -6.22 **
EURO AREA 2.66 -0.67 -2.78
2008-20131999-2003 2004-2007
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4 Understanding the impact of the euro on GDP per capita 
Since the end of World War II, Europe’s history has been one of continuous steps towards 
achieving not only economic integration – the ECSC, the EEC and the Single Market – but 
also further political coordination. In this context, the launching of the euro was a bold move, 
not ever tried before by such a large set of nations, where the two motivations intertwined 
(Baldwin et al, 2008). In fact, member countries decided to join the euro even though they 
were well aware that the candidate countries did not constitute an optimal currency area. 
That is to say, despite fulfilling the nominal criteria set out in the Treaty of Maastricht, the area 
still lacked the desirable wage flexibility, labour mobility as well as the implementation of a 
common budgetary union13. 
However, the countries decided to embark on such an ambitious project since they 
estimated that the greater economic integration expected from lower transaction costs would 
lead member countries endogenously to achieve convergence in real terms. Moreover, the 
increase in trade among member countries would also prompt the implementation of the 
pending structural reforms to gain further competitiveness (Artis and Zhang, 1995 and Frankel 
and Rose, 1998). 
Regarding the first channel – trade integration – results derived from the adoption of 
the euro turned out not to be as fruitful as expected in the literature. Early studies predicted 
that the exchange rate stability and the single currency could trigger trade above 300% (Glick 
and Rose, 2002). This sizeable effect was later reduced by other researchers who found a 
significant positive effect of around a 5% increase14 (Baldwin et al 2008). More recently, Glick 
and Rose (2015) revisited the literature on the effect of currency unions on trade and exports 
using a variety of empirical gravity models. Their results point out that EMU typically has a 
smaller trade effect than other currency unions but also that there is no consistent evidence 
that EMU stimulated trade15. 
The adoption of the euro coincided with China’s surge to prominence in world trade. 
The emergence of this new player completely changed the trade relations between all parties 
with an immediate consequence: all developed countries lost export share to China (Figure 11). 
Besides, production by firms was completely reorganised with the increasing presence of global 
value chains. Using the new information available from WIOD input-output tables16, Cuenca and 
Gordo (2015) document that, from 2000 onwards, euro area countries increased the proportion 
of intermediate inputs from eastern Europe and Asian emerging economies at the expense of 
those from other euro area countries. All in all, Figure 12 summarises the behaviour of trade 
flows within the euro area: the proportion of intra-euro area  imports and exports remained fairly 
stable or even diminished in some countries. That is to say, partly because of the emergence of 
China as a major player in world trade and partly because of the increasing international 
fragmentation of production, the euro did not bring the expected boost to economic integration.  
                                                                          
13. For an overview analysis of the expected economic benefits and cost of the common currency see Mongelli and 
Vega (2006). 
14. Moreover, Baldwin et al (2008) qualified the origin of this increase. The channel was not one of lower Mundellian 
“transaction costs”, but one of increasing competition derived from the extensive margin – newly-traded goods hypothesis. 
15. They find that results are very sensitive to the exact econometric methodology. 
16. WIOD dataset allows to disentangle foreign contribution to final production. 
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Figure 11: Change in real export share of global trade in goods and services in 2007 
(1998=100) 
         Source: Eurostat 
As for the second channel, the designers of the euro were confident that market 
pressure would perform a key role in preventing imbalances given that sovereign interest rates 
would act as a red flag. However, international investors thought about the euro as a 
homogeneous union without taking into account the financial risks associated with the 
economic divergences (Malo de Molina, 2011). Therefore, government willingness to adopt the 
structural reforms needed quickly vanished (Alesina et al, 2010), especially in the peripheral 
countries, where the buoyant growth during the early 2000s led to a situation of “reform 
anaesthesia”, that is, a feeling that the reforms to facilitate an effective adjustment in the 
monetary union were no longer urgent (European Commission 2008). Duval and Elmeskov 
(2006) find that although, using a long perspective, euro area countries have undertaken more 
structural reforms than in other OECD countries, over the period 1999-2004 the intensity of 
reforms was lower than in the period 1994-1998 and this slowdown was not observed in non-
euro area EU countries. 
Figure 12.a: Share of intra-euro area exports Figure 12.b: Share of intra-euro area imports 
Source: Eurostat. 
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The fact that these two channels did not come into operation helps to explain why 
the adoption of the euro did not give the expected boost to GDP per capita during the 
years prior to the Great Recession. The euro area registered only a small and temporary 
increase of GDP per capita, with respect to its counterfactual, which did not turn out to be 
significant. However, as we documented in the previous section, benefits were very 
heterogeneous with the peripheral countries registering the highest gains. Where did these 
gains come from? 
                          Figure 13: 10-year government bond rates 
Source: European Central Bank. 
The euro area did bring closer financial integration. Figure 13 shows how 10-year 
government bond rates quickly converged towards very low levels not previously registered, 
especially in peripheral countries. It is in fact in part of these countries, Spain, Greece and 
Ireland, where the adoption of the euro brought the highest significant benefits in terms of 
GDP per capita. The sharp decrease in real interest rates eased their access to the credit 
markets, stimulating domestic demand and alleviating the lack of productivity-enhancing 
reforms. Therefore, the capital inflows into these countries failed to generate a lasting increase 
in productive capital. Figure 14 shows how gains from joining the euro area during the boom 
years turn out to be positively correlated with credit expansion, but at the same time, they 
also turn out to be positively correlated with growing imbalances, such as, rising unit labour 
costs or wider negative trade imbalances (Lane, 2006). 
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Figure 14: Gains from the adoption of the euro vis-à-vis debt, unit labour costs and 
trade balance 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In the case of Italy and Portugal, the other two peripheral countries, the gains from 
joining the euro were however small, non-significant and vanished very quickly. From 2004 
onwards the euro brought them losses that turned out to be significant. Part of these 
disappointing developments stem from the fact that their higher debt levels before the euro 
was adopted limited their chances of accessing further credit and their domestic demand 
being based on GDP growth. But also, Italy and Portugal are countries that during the 2000s 
experienced a severe drop in their export shares without adopting reforms that would have 
bolstered foreign demand (Blanchard, 2007). 
Finally countries from the central euro area - Germany, Austria and the Netherlands-, 
as we depicted in Figure 8, do not seem to obtain gains or losses from the adoption of the 
euro: observed GDP per capita follows the same path as that predicted by the counterfactual. 
In this case, even though they faced higher real interest rates and despite the competitive 
pressure from China, they managed to reduce unit labour costs and increase their external 
competitiveness through structural reforms that mainly gave more flexibility to their labour 
market (Scharpf, 2011 and Veld et al, 2015). These counteracting forces balanced evenly the 
final outcome from the adoption of the euro. 
The launching of the monetary union was an additional step, although probably the 
most ambitious one, in the process of European integration that started just after World War 
II. It is not the last stepping stone, but an additional one. In order to contextualize the benefits 
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of the adoption of the euro within the European integration process, we have compared, for 
two countries – Spain and Portugal –, the benefits of joining the European Union with the 
benefits of joining the euro area. Results, displayed in Figure 15, show that although the euro 
did not bring the expected lasting gains, the GDP per capita of both countries is currently 
higher than it would have been, had they not participated in the European integration process 
(Campos et al, 2015). These results highlight the welfare improving effects of the integration 
process, but they also stress the need for further steps to “implement a consistent strategy 
around the virtuous triangle of growth-enhancing structural reforms, investment and fiscal 
responsibility” (Junker et al, 2015). 
Figure 15: GDP per capita. Observed vs. synthetic estimation  
  
Note: The solid black line is the observed euro area GDP per capita, the dashed black line is the euro 
area synthetic estimation and the dashed green line is the EU synthetic estimation.  
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5 Concluding remarks 
The process of the adoption of the monetary union was preceded by a very intense debate 
on the gains and costs of launching a common currency. However, scepticism was finally set 
apart and the idea that the monetary union would imply a jump to a lasting growth path 
prevailed. In this paper we attempt to answer the question of what euro area GDP per capita 
would have been, had the monetary union not taken place. With this objective, we use the 
synthetic control methodology to build a counterfactual of the GDP per capita of the euro 
area and its initial member countries. 
Although we have assessed the robustness of the exercise, empirical applications 
like the one presented here have to be interpreted with caution since defining a counterfactual 
is always subject to a variety of potential biases. Also, the longer the prediction horizon 
considered, the less reliable the counterfactual becomes, since non-controlled shocks in the 
pool of country donors or even in the treated country might take place. In fact, the 2010 debt 
crisis might be considered as an additional shock to the euro area countries. That’s why 
although all our figures throughout the paper show the GDP per capita developments up to 
2013, we do not draw any conclusion from the Great Recession period. That would require 
further research. Our analysis has only referred to the pre-crisis period. 
Results show that the adoption of the monetary union in the euro area did not 
produce the expected lasting increase in GDP per capita. During the early 2000s adoption of 
the euro had a slightly positive effect on euro area GDP per capita but the effect turned 
negative afterwards. In the medium term, since the mid-2000s, the synthetic euro area 
predicts that GDP per capita should have climbed above the levels registered, erasing the 
initial gains obtained from the adoption of the euro. 
Behind this aggregate result, we identify three different patterns across countries. 
First, for the group of countries comprising Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, joining the 
euro did not bring any significant gain or loss relative to their counterfactual. Second, the 
group of countries including Spain, Ireland and Greece greatly benefit from joining the euro 
during the years of expansion. And finally, in the third group – Italy, Portugal and Belgium - 
the relative gains from adopting the common currency were very temporary and quickly 
translated into losses relative to the counterfactual. 
The success of the euro relied on endogenously achieving real convergence, which 
would act as an external constraint pushing countries to pursue structural reforms and 
thereby increasing potential output. The anticipated further trade integration was expected to 
also spur market demands for implementing the pending structural reforms. However, the 
emergence of China as a major player in world trade severely affected the second ingredient 
from coming into operation and prompted reforms in the central European countries which 
faced heightened external competitiveness, but not in the peripheral countries as was initially 
expected and desired. Also, the favourable financing conditions brought by the euro to 
previously inflationary member countries induced governments to delay the needed structural 
reforms. Therefore, the lack of a significant positive difference between the observed path of 
the euro area GDP per capita and its counterfactual might not be attributed to the common 
currency per se but to a combination of different factors, included the perversion of the 
incentives to implement the much needed structural reforms. 
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This evaluation of the euro project in terms of per capita GDP has to be understood, 
however, in the broader context of European integration where continuous and decisive steps 
forward have to be taken. The recent Five Presidents’ Report highlights that in order for all 
members to gain from the euro, they will need to evolve from the current system of rules and 
guidelines involved in national economic policy-making towards a system of further 
sovereignty-sharing within common institutions. This will require Member States increasingly 
to accept joint decision-making on aspects of their respective national budgets and economic 
policies. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1:  GDP per capita of the euro area and countries from the donor pool. 
Observed vs. synthetic estimation (pre-treatment period 1970-1998). 
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Figure A2:  Euro area member countries’ GDP per capita. Observed vs. 
synthetic estimation (pre-treatment period 1970-1998). Core countries. 
 
 
Figure A3:  Euro Area member countries’ GDP per capita. Observed vs.  
synthetic estimation (pre-treatment period 1970-1998). Peripheral countries. 
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   Table A1: Synthetic weights of countries in the donor pool 
 
 
                       Table A2: Mean of GDP per capita and its determinants before the adoption  
                                                              of the euro (1992-1998). 
 
 
 
NETHERLANDS GERMANY AUSTRIA ITALY PORTUGAL BELGIUM FRANCE FINLAND IRELAND SPAIN GREECE
AUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CAN 0 0 0 0 0 0.28 0 0 0 0 0
CHE 0.19 0.51 0.35 0.25 0.01 0.18 0 0 0 0 0.31
ISL 0.46 0.07 0.28 0.00 0.52 0.46 0.34 0.14 0 0.30 0.07
JAP 0 0.18 0 0.25 0 0 0.57 0 0 0.24 0
KOR 0.11 0 0.22 0 0.02 0.09 0 0.03 0.67 0 0.05
MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 0
NOR 0.23 0 0.15 0.08 0 0 0 0.36 0.33 0.09 0
NZL 0.00 0.18 0 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TUR 0 0.07 0 0.20 0.45 0 0.10 0.17 0 0.36 0.57
USA 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NETHERLANDS GERMANY
Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic 
GDP PER CAPITA 28768.89 28756.02 27813.58 27841.87 27598.58 27730.87
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.54
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.18
INVESTMENT (SHARE OF GDP) 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.23
EXPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.49 0.33 0.23 0.27 0.35 0.31
IMPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.43 0.28 0.23 0.24 0.36 0.28
AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION 10.51 9.68 9.41 9.87 8.64 9.77
DEPENDENCY RATIO 21.25 21.24 25.46 21.96 24.69 20.11
Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic 
GDP PER CAPITA 25149.12 25144.97 17847.58 17867.03 26778.90 26823.93 25357.31 25356.46
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.19
INVESTMENT (SHARE OF GDP) 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.23
EXPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.62 0.30 0.20 0.17
IMPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.60 0.28 0.19 0.17
AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION 7.75 9.54 6.45 7.04 9.72 9.62 8.30 9.27
DEPENDENCY RATIO 26.81 20.69 25.10 15.85 26.52 19.62 25.83 21.01
Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic  Treated Synthetic 
GDP PER CAPITA 22280.90 22286.08 22276.90 22380.67 21247.63 21244.90 17798.26 17790.56
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.70 0.64
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION (SHARE OF GDP) 0.27 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.13
INVESTMENT (SHARE OF GDP) 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.21
EXPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.29 0.28 0.57 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.22
IMPORTS (SHARE OF GDP) 0.26 0.21 0.49 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.21
AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION 9.16 9.16 10.88 10.39 7.73 7.93 8.18 6.89
DEPENDENCY RATIO 23.47 17.37 20.66 15.37 25.48 18.30 25.08 15.67
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